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New Institutional Economics, based on the Coasean comparative approach, offers a highly useful 
framework for research on environmental problems. We propose a tentative analytic framework for 
environmental problems and we try its heuristic power by first applying it to the Poitou-Charentes 
region, which encounters problems of negative externalities concerning its water resource. We can 
thus identify the characteristics of this environmental issue through the lens of the transaction costs 
theory.  Finally,  we  draw  conclusions  about  the  relative  efficiency  of  the  various  governance 
institutions potentially available to deal with the problems of externalities in the area in question. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Today, many areas are affected by coordination problems involving agents or groups of agents with 
respect to the use of localised resources, problems which can lead to resource use conflicts. These 
problems and their resolutions are usually analysed within the theory of externalities, especially 
through the opposition between Pigou (1932) and Coase (1960). We argue that New Institutional 
Economics,  based  on  the  Coasean  comparative  approach,  offers  a  highly  useful  framework  for 
research on environmental problems. This alternative approach, regarded as complementary to the 
theory of externalities, studies a continuum of arrangements, whereas Welfare Economics is only 
focused on the Market versus State opposition. In these alternative works, the emphasis is laid on 
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Using this framework, we are able to discuss the relative efficiency of the different institutional 
alternatives. 
The first contribution of our communication consists of a literature survey of several attempts to 
apply New Institutional Economics to environmental problems (Déprés, 2006 ; Bougherara et al., 
forthcoming ; Richman and Boerner, 2006 ; Grolleau and Salhi, 2009). Starting from insights from 
Coase  and  Williamson,  these  works  extend  Transaction  Costs  Economics  to  other  kinds  of 
transactions  such  as  externalities  problems,  by  bringing  out  their  latent  contractual  features 
(Williamson,  2002).  Thanks  to  our  literature  survey,  we  insist  on  implications  of  applying  this 
theoretical framework to the analysis of environmental problems, and more especially we underline 
the fruitfulness of the approach developed by Grolleau and Salhi (2009). 
The second contribution consists in testing the heuristic power of this latter proposal through an 
empirical  study  of  the  French  administrative  region  of  Poitou-Charentes,  which  presents  an 
important  conflict  with  regard  to  the  water  resource  between  various  agents  and  economic 
activities, especially farmers and shellfish farmers. This particular environmental problem, examined 
in Transaction Costs Economics terms, allows, on the one hand, to go one step further in the analysis 
by studying the role of other attributes of environmental transactions, not integrated by Grolleau 
and Salhi (2009), and on the other hand, to justify state intervention thanks to this “extended” 
typology of attributes, given the features of environmental problems regarding the water resource in 
Poitou-Charentes. 
We first survey a number of attempts at applying new institutional approaches to environmental 
problems. We demonstrate the relevance of the approach developed by Grolleau et Salhi (2009), and 
from these works, we propose a tentative analytic framework for environmental problems. We then 
try the heuristic power of this framework by first applying it to the Poitou-Charentes region, which 
encounters problems of negative externalities concerning its water resource. We can thus identify 
the  characteristics of  this  environmental  issue  through  the  lens of  the transaction  costs  theory. 
Finally,  we  draw  conclusions  about  the relative efficiency of the various  governance  institutions 
potentially available to deal with the problems of externalities in the area in question. 
 
2.  A tentative analytic framework for environmental problems 
2.1.  Application attempts 
We  can  list  several  attempts  at  transposing  the  new  institutional  comparative  method  to 
environmental  problems  in  a  context  of  negative  externalities,  taking  into  account  the  specific 
characteristics for each of the transactions analysed. 
Lévêque  (2000)  mentions  that  the  "institutional  analysis  toolbox  for  approaching  the  issue  of 
environmental  regulations  is  empty  in  comparison to  that  available  for  answering  the  industrial 
'make or buy' question, as developed by Williamson (1975). So it appears that the methodological 
orientations proposed by Coase to determine solutions for nuisance reduction have remained no 
more than mere general principles”(our translation). As a result, several authors put forward the 






































(Richards, 2000 ; Paavola and Adger, 2005). But few of authors have actually tried applying Coasean 
insights through the development of a transactionalist analysis of environmental problems. 
Transaction costs are usually disregarded in environmental economics  because, as McCann and 
Easter  (1999)  put  it,  "Environmental  policy  studies  usually  implicitly  or  explicitly  assume  that 
transaction costs are negligible or that they differ little between policies". But integrating transaction 
costs  into  the  analysis  would  allow  to  complete,  and  even  modify,  results  regarding  the 
determination  of  the  most  suitable  instruments  to  deal  with  phenomenons  of  externalities. 
Comparing different institutional arrangements would thus cease to be based on the principle of  
abatement costs minimisation only (Bureau, 2005), once the costs generated by the coordination 
between  agents  are  taken  into  account.  So,  new  institutional  approaches  turn  out  to  be 
complementary  to  the  theory  of  externalities.  Integrating  transaction  costs  into  the  economic 
analysis of the ways to regulate environmental problems allows to observe the relative efficiency of 
the different arrangements with a total cost approach, that is to say an approach which takes into 
account both the nuisance reduction costs and the transaction costs (McCann and Easter (1999). The 
integration of transaction costs thus means a real advantage for the organisation of the institutional 
arrangements into a hierarchy. To that end, McCann and Easter (1999), and McCann et al. (2005) 
have tried to improve the possibility of integrating transaction costs, by introducing cost typologies 
and methodologies for the measurement of transaction costs. 
Environmental  problems  can  be  conceptualised  as  instances  of  interdependence  involving  the 
existence  of  transaction  costs.  So,  the  application  of  the  transaction  costs  approach  appears 
particularly relevant for analysing the choice of suitable ways to manage environmental problems. 
"Starting from this basic tenet of economics, transaction cost analysis can provide a refreshing way to 
evaluate alternative methods of resolving conflicting uses" (Bougherara et al., forthcoming). So just 
as the market-firm opposition can be examined in the light of the transaction costs theory, this 
theory can also be used to analyse various ways of dealing with negative environmental externalities. 
In the same way, Husted (2004) states that "Although environmental regulation has not generally 
been viewed through the lens of transaction costs, the logic is quite similar". 
Our review of the existing literature leads us to observe that several application attempts (Déprés, 
2006; Richman and Boerner, 2006 ; Bougherara et al., forthcoming) take as their starting point the 
Williamsonian  approach,  based  on  the  principle  of  aligning  governance  institutions  on  the 
characteristics of a given transaction. The important thing is then to specify the attributes of the 
transactions examined, so as to appreciate the efficiency of the different governance institutions. 
The authors use all or some of the basic categories in Williamsonian analysis - namely frequency, 
uncertainty, and asset specificity - and redefine their role in the context of environmental problems. 
Using  these  notions  for  environmental  problems  analysis  allows  to  take  into  account  some 
contractual risks. The goal is then to identify the governance mechanisms that would offer the best 
management of these contractual risks : " the specificity of the physical and human assets combined 
with  frequency  and  uncertainty  determines  the  choice  of  efficient  contractual  arrangements" 
(Déprés,  2006)  (our  translation).  So,  it  is  possible  to  choose  between  different  instruments  of 
environmental problem management using the criteria identified by Williamson. 
However,  as  McCann  et  al.  (2005)  stress  it,  the  commonly  identified  categories  of  frequency, 
uncertainty and specificity are not necessarily the most relevant when it comes to handling the issue 






































than those of Williamson, so as to integrate the specificities of environmental transactions (Déprés, 
2006 ; Richman and Boerner, 2006 ; Bougherera et al., forthcoming). They seek to identify the origins 
of transaction costs in the context of environmental problems as precisely as possible. Three main 
factors can  be  identified :  measurement  problems (regarding  the  origin of  the  nuisance  and  its 
consequences (Husted, 2004)), the number and heterogeneity of the agents, and the property rights 
on environmental goods. Most environmental problems actually involve a high number of different 
agents and are characterised by a lack of property rights on the natural goods at stake as well as 
measurement  problems  concerning  the  relations  between  man  and  nature.  (Déprés,  2006). 
Depending on the relative weight of these different criteria, state intervention can appear more or 
less justified (Bougherara et al, forthcoming). On the opposite, transaction costs can sometimes be 
overcome  by  implementing  innovative  processes  (Déprés,  2008).  Analysing  the  organisational 
implications in the context of environmental problems through the lens of the transaction costs 
theory can thus help us draw conclusions about the presupposed efficiency of different ways of 
dealing with environmental negative externalities.  
Bougherara  et  al.  (forthcoming)  encourage  researchers  to  continue  their  work  on  the 
implementation of Williamsonian analysis to environmental problems. Further research is needed 
regarding the definition of an environmental transaction and the precise identification of the key-
attributes  and  involved  agents.  We  consider  that  the  research  conducted  by  Grolleau  and  Salhi 
(2009) answers some of these questions, as they go one step further in the implementation process 
by truly adapting the analytic framework developed by Williamson to the context of environmental 
transactions. They don't re-use the transaction dimensions exactly as Williamson introduced them, 
but take up the same approach, defining the environmental transaction with the use of several 
parameters.  They  establish  a  new  typology  of  transaction  attributes  applied  to  environmental 
problems, in order to characterise environmental transaction as precisely as possible, and identify 
contractual risks, and in turn transaction costs. This typology can then be used to analyse a given 
environmental problem in a given area, and allows to compare the situations observed in several 
distinct areas. The authors have thus formalised the relationships between the level of transaction 
costs and the dimensions characterising an environmental transaction.  
As the contribution made by Grolleau and Salhi (2009), regarding the application of the transaction 
costs approach to environmental problems, appeared to us to be particularly interesting, we decided 
to use the analytic framework they introduced, while proposing a few adjustments. 
2.2.  Proposed framework for the analysis of environmental transaction attributes 
-  Property Rights System 
Property rights are defined as codified relationships between people, regarding the use of things. The 
exchange  of  property  rights  implies  setting  up  a  whole  property  rights  system  (universality, 
exclusivity, transferability and protection). The rights are then precisely defined, at the quantitative, 
qualitative and temporal (duration) levels. Rights owners are recognised as such and their use of the 
rights is protected. The right of property enables to exclude all agents who do not own this right, and 
any violation is punished. Transferability enables the owner to transfer his rights, by selling or giving 
them, in part or in whole, to one or several agents. An incomplete property rights system causes an 
increase in the information, exclusion and negotiation costs. So, transaction costs imply an exchange 






































complicated,  and  more  expensive.  Williamson  has  actually  stated,  regarding  the  extension  of 
transaction costs  approach to other fields of analysis, that weak property rights could play a similar 
role to that of asset specificity, by generating contractual risks (Williamson, 2005). 
There  are  no  property  rights  on environmental  goods  in  France :  "Natural  areas,  resources  and 
habitats, as well as the vegetable and animal species in their diversity, and the ecological systems 
they  shape,  are  all  part  of  our  communal  national  heritage.  Protecting  them,  enhancing  their 
qualities, and restoring them to their original condition are in the general interest (...)" (French Rural 
Code, Article L.200-1, our translation) Environmental goods are, in principle, non-excludable. But if 
an appropriation is feasible, rights of use can be defined, however incompletely so in most cases, 
owing to technical difficulties or costs. (Hagedorn, Artz et al., 2002).  
 
-  Uncertainty : Measurement Problems and Imperfect Information 
The  inherent  characteristics  of  the  environmental  problem,  often  in  interaction  with  the 
measurement  problem,  and  in  relation  with  limited  and  asymmetrical  information  on  the 
environmental resources and nuisance, all add up to create complex situations.  
The  characteristics  of  the  nuisance  can  be  more  or  less  complex  depending  on  cases.    The 
characteristics are linked both to the origins and the consequences of the nuisance. The nuisance 
generated can occur at a distance from or some time after an agent's action. The nuisance can be 
generated by a combination of causes, that were not harmful when taken individually. Moreover, it 
can sometimes be difficult to clearly trace back the causal chain. A nuisance can be more or less 
reversible  depending  on  the  possibility  to  stop  it  and  to  make  up  for  the  prejudicial  effects 
generated. It can be consciously generated by an agent or an economic activity, or only result from a 
joint effect. Finally, a nuisance can be quite clearly limited to a particular area, with no propagation 
to other environmental goods or to other areas, or on the contrary be scattered and hard to localise.  
 
Technical  measurement  difficulties  or  problems  of  measurement  costs  can  arise.  These 
measurement problems can arise from difficulties to define and measure the potential connection 
between an activity and a nuisance, or difficulties to adopt a course of action, and to make sure the 
latter is enforced. It may also be difficult to assess the potential efforts made by an agent to reduce 
the nuisance, as the visible effects, or whose impact on the environment, can take some time to 
appear,and therefore will not be measurable in the short term. Williamson (1991) considers that the 
capacity to measure represents a major dimension in the transactions, just as important as asset 
specificity or uncertainty. Barzel (2004) indicates that measurement capacity is more operational and 
general  than  asset  specificity.  When  a  nuisance  is  easily  identifiable,  and  measurable,  legal 
responsibility  can  be  established  more  easily  and  with  little  expense.  On  the  opposite,  when 
measurement is more problematic, state intervention is justified (Husted, 2004), because it allows to 
save money on governance costs
1. Finally, measurement problems also mean an increase of control 
costs, that also justify the intervention of a centralised authority such as the State. 
Environmental  problems  are  often  affected  by  uncertainty,  owing  to  imperfect  or  asymmetrical 
information. Environmental goods are mostly non-commercial goods, so they are affected by an 
uncertainty  regarding  the  demand  for  activities  and  the  increase  in  value  resulting  from  the 
                                                           
1 The OECD (2001) states that in a number of cases "calling upon Command and Control type instruments is 
necessary. It is especially the case when technical problems or measurement problems make it difficult to 
permanently  assess  the  environmental  damage  attributable  to  individual  agents  [...]",  since  this  type  of 






































economic development of these activities. Some agents, more often than not those at the origin of 
the nuisance, have informational advantages over the other agents involved, in particular those who 
suffer from the nuisance. These instances of information asymmetry can lead some agents to adopt 
an  opportunistic  behaviour  and  seek  to  draw  advantages  from  the  situation  (Bougherara  et  al., 
forthcoming), namely by encouraging the establishment of institutional arrangements in their favour, 
or  that  put  their  competitors  at  a  disadvantage.  Moreover,  agents  that  have  an  informational 
advantage can be tempted to falsify the information they possess. Finally, the courses of action 
carried out to reduce the uncertainty linked to environmental problems also generate costs. 
All things considered, "the coordination of transactions affected by uncertainties [...] is provided 
more efficiently by regulating mechanisms than by competitive mechanisms, all other things being 
equal" (Déprés, 2006, our translation). 
 
-  Transaction Structure : frequency, number of agents involved, degree of heterogeneity 
With  reference  to  the  market  structure,  the  transaction  structure  depends  on  the  transaction 
frequency as well as on the number and the heterogeneity of the agents involved. 
Since  the  characteristics  of  the  environmental  problem  in  question  will  have  an  impact  on  the 
transaction structure. The frequency of a nuisance (occasional, isolated versus recurrent, long-term) 
will have an impact on the frequency of the environmental transaction (low frequency for an isolated 
nuisance  versus  high  frequency  for  a  recurrent  nuisance  (Déprés,  2006  ;  Bougherara  et  al., 
forthcoming)).  The  frequency  of  a  given  transaction  will  have  a  negative  influence  on  the  cost 
observed when using a governance institution. The number and heterogeneity of the transactants 
(within a group of transactants or between transactants) will have an impact on the transaction 
costs, and ultimately on the relative efficiency of the possible ways to manage the environmental 
problem. 
So, if the nuisance is not very complex (for instance, in the case of an isolated nuisance, identifiable 
and localised), we can assume that there will be a relatively low number of agents involved. (Déprés, 
2006). If only two agents are involved (or two groups dealing with one another), the transaction costs 
are  reduced,  so  Coase-type  bargaining  can  be  considered,  but  a  bilateral-monopoly-type 
configuration complicates the conclusion of the environmental transaction
2. This "face-to-face" type 
of transaction is not the most common : in reality, most environmental problems are complex and 
involve  a  great  number  of  economic  agents  that  are  legally  autonomous,  which  leads  to  high 
transaction  costs.  Olson  (1965)  considers  that  transaction  costs  increase  with  the  number  of 
transactants.  The  configuration  involving  several  transactants  makes  it  more  complex  to  find 
solutions, as the coordination problem is no more limited to a bilateral transaction. (Déprés, 2006) 
and Richards (2000) indicates that a negotiation becomes impossible. However, the more the agents 
involved will be able to group together, the lower the transaction costs will be. So, in the case of a 
great number of agents, which will make the intervention of a centralised authority more adequate, 
grouping together will allow to reduce the number of transactants, which will make it possible to 
reach contractual arrangements. 
Transactants heterogeneity refers to the discrepancies between the agents, between their actions 
and between the technologies at their disposal. Williamson (1985) considers that the number and 
heterogeneity of the parties involved in a transaction will have a positive impact on the level of the 
                                                           






































transaction costs. The risk of opportunism is then more important, so trying to reach a voluntary 
agreement  will  increase  the  costs  (Ostrom,  1990).  Déprés  (2006)  stresses  that  a  situation 
characterised by a great  number of highly heterogeneous agents can be managed by regulatory 
agreements. Finally, there is a connection between the agents' heterogeneity and their opportunity 
cost, since heterogeneity will mean different opportunity costs (i.e. what the potential transactants 
have  to  lose  in  the  eventuality  of  the  transfer  not  taking  place).  The  agent  with  the  highest 
opportunity cost has the most important incentive to solve the environmental problem, and can 
decide to solve it unilaterally. 
 
-  Asset specificity 
An asset is said to be specific when the investment for a given transaction cannot be re-deployed for 
another transaction without a high cost. Due to these costs, ending the relationship is not desirable 
for the investor. 
If a specific asset is present within a transaction, it can be a cause of contractual risks, linked with the 
potentially opportunist behaviour of one agent, who will want to capture the quasi-rent derived from 
the bilateral dependency of such a situation.  
Williamson makes a distinction between 6 types of specificity : site specificity (asset value based on 
its localisation and high relocation costs), brand  names (intangible asset that increases an asset 
value),  human  asset  (highly  specialised  skills  and  experience,  and  hard  to  redeploy  on  other 
activities), dedicated assets, time specificity (an asset is time specific if its value is dependent on 
production deadlines being met) and physical asset specificity (specialised equipment)... 
Opportunistic agents may prefer their personal objective rather than the collective objective (risk of 
adverse selection), hence an increase in transaction costs. 
The market provides an organisational structure that will have low costs in the case of non-specific 
assets.  On  the  other  hand,  transactions  involving  highly  specific  assets  will  be  managed  more 
efficiently by an authority than by the market, through the minimisation of costs related to this type 






Environmental Transaction Attributes (adapted from Grolleau and Salhi, 2009) 
Structuring attributes of 
the environmental 
transactions 
Further information concerning attribute contents 





-  Degree of complexity of the environmental problem's characteristics (causes and 
consequences) 
-  Measurement difficulties (technical feasibility, cost) 
-  Uncertainty (imperfect/asymmetrical information, cost) 
Transaction structure 
Market structure 
-  Transaction frequency (high/low) 
-  Number of agents involved (high/low number, grouping of agents) 








































Different  types  of  specificity  :  site,  physical,  brand  names,  human,  dedicated 
assets, time. 
 
Based on the analysis developed by Grolleau and Salhi (2009), we have highlighted the attributes 
enabling to identify the contractual characteristics in the context of environmental problems. We 
propose  to try  the  heuristic  power  of  this  framework  by  applying  it to  a  particularly conflictual 
territory, namely the Poitou-Charentes region, characterised by problems of negative externalities 
concerning its water resource. Grolleau and Salhi (2009) stressed the importance of carrying out case 
studies in order to further research the implementation of new institutional approaches in the case 
of negative environmental externalities. 
 
3.  A few determining facts about the territory of Poitou Charentes and its 
environmental issue 
 
The overall  water  resource  in  France  is  abundant  (internal  resource  of  around  170  billion cubic 
metres per year, i.e. 2,800 cubic metres per person and per year). But this resource is not evenly 
distributed on the French territory and its level varies depending on the season, as do the amounts of 
water removed from it. As a result, some French regions can suffer from a shortage of water for 
periods of time of variable durations. This type of environmental problems also entails economic 
problems, given the water-dependent nature of a number of economic activities. In the Poitou-
Charentes  region,  a  quantitative  pressure  on  the  water  resource  is  exerted  during  the  summer 
months, precisely at a time when its level is by nature at its lowest. During that period, the need for 
water  exceeds  the  territory's  capacity  to  "produce"  water,  as  the  region  is  characterised  by 
important problems in the management of its territorial organisation, with issues of competition and 
negative externalities, that can lead to resource use conflicts over water.  
The Poitou-Charentes region is composed of four "départements" : Deux-Sèvres, Vienne, Charente, 
and  Charente-Maritime  (the  only  coastal  département).  Poitou-Charentes  is  a  rural,  attractive 
territory  (7th  most  attractive  French  region  (Décimal  n°269,  January  2007)),  but  offers  a  sharp 
contrast between its inland part, rural and sparsely populated, and its coastal edge, attractive and 
densely populated. The leading economic activities of the region all depend on the water resource 
(see  the  map  in  the  appendix).  Agriculture,  located  on  the  territory's  higher  lands,  exerts  both 
quantitative  (due  the  volume  needed  for  irrigation)  and  qualitative
3  (fertilisers  and  pesticides) 
constraints on the water resource. The regional turnover generated by irrigated maize is more than 
160 million euro. The water resource is also an important asset in the Poitou-Charentes tourist 
attractiveness  (Charente-Maritime  shoreline  and  an  overall  2,600  km  of  rivers).  The  turnover 
generated by tourism exceeds 2.5 billion euro, and Charente-Maritime is the second most important 
département in terms of tourist attendance. This high number of tourists also implies a high demand 
in drinking water during the summer months (the Charente-Maritime population is almost doubled in 
the summer, as a result of tourism). Moreover, tourist and leisure activities such as swimming or 
fishing require an acceptable amount of water. Finally, shellfish farming, in the downriver part of the 
region, does not abstract water, but is dependent on its quality and quantity. Two distinct types of 
shellfish farming can be noted : oyster farming and mussel farming. The Poitou-Charentes region is 
                                                           






































the first shellfish farming region in France, and the Marennes-Oléron bay, to the south of Charente-
Maritime, is the most important in Europe. Shellfish farming is a very specific activity of the region, 
although its turnover is less important (around 250 million euro).  
We  conducted  an  analysis  of  the  regional  economic  activities  and  studied  conflictuality  on  the 
coastline of Poitou-Charentes, based on two complementary sources : the Regional Daily Press, with 
an  analysis  of  articles  from  the  Charente-Maritime  edition  of  the  daily  newspaper  "Sud-Ouest" 
relating environmental resource use conflicts in 2005 on the one hand, and interviews of around 
thirty  Poitou-Charentes  agents  (professionals,  institutions,  local  councillors,  members  of 
associations,...) on the other hand. Our fieldwork enabled us to identify the various agents involved 
in the environmental problems posed by the water resource in the region. We can differentiate 
between two types of water-dependent uses : the use that actually removes water - such as the use 
in irrigated agriculture, the use for the supply of drinking water (SDW)
4, or less importantly the 
industrial use - and the use that does not remove water - such as the use involved in shellfish 
farming,  the  use of the ecosystem (the  interests of  which  are  defended  by several  associations 
dedicated  to  the  conservation  of  the  environment),  and  some  tourist  activities  (canoeing  for 
instance). Even though all these uses are linked with the problems of externalities regarding the 
water resource, the most important resource use conflict involves two groups of economic agents, 
namely farmers and shellfish farmers, as well as environmental organisations. So our study will focus 
on this particular resource use conflict.  
The overall amount of water abstracted at the regional level amounts to more than 380 million cubic 
metres, 36% being taken from surface water, and 64% from groundwater. (Adour- Garonne and 
Loire-Bretagne Water Agencies, 2006). Owing to incentives from the CAP and local policies in favour 
of irrigation, the agricultural activity has by far the most significant impact on the water resource. It 
accounts for more than 50% of the water abstracted at the regional level, and comes before the 
household use (around 39%), and the industrial use (less than 7%). In Charente-Maritime, the only 




Gross water abstractions by département and by use in 2006 
Millions of cubic metres  
(% of the total) 














































Source : Adour-Garonne and Loire-Bretagne Water agencies 
                                                           
4 The supply of drinking water (SDW) includes all the activities of water production. This water can be used for drinking, 






































The volume of water removed for agriculture is even more significant in net value, when we consider 
that only 30% of that volume is released back into the environment, whereas the figure goes up to 
76% and even 93% for the household use and the industrial use respectively. (L'eau et ses usages en 
Poitou-Charentes 2008). So, the net volume of water abstracted regionally adds up to 35.8 million 
cubic metres for the household use, 144.5 million cubic metres for the agricultural use, and 1.8 
million cubic metres for the industrial use.  
As regards agriculture, we can observe a fast increase in the overall irrigated land area from 1979 to 
1992,  and  a  relative  stabilisation  from  1993  to  2004.  The  evolution  of  the  volumes  taken  for 
agriculture  over  the  period  is  not  representative  as  counting  and  reporting  was  only  made 
compulsory in 1997. Irrigation is primarily reserved for cereals, and most particularly for production 
of grain maize
5 : the Poitou-Charentes region comes third in terms of irrigated land area
6 (behind 
Aquitaine and Midi-Pyrénées). 
Understanding  resource  use  conflicts  linked  to  phenomena  of  negative  externalities  implies  a 
questioning of the coordination quality between the economic agents involved. To that end, we 
chose  to  try  the  heuristic  power  of  our  analytic  framework,  by  confronting  the  attributes  of 
environmental transactions identified to the Poitou-Charentes features with the aim of observing the 
explanatory power of these variables, and the potential evolutions with regard to the level or the 
nature  of  these  variables.  Moreover,  once  the  dimensions  have  been  identified  thanks  to  their 
impact on the level of transaction costs, we will be able to identify the governance mode suited for 
the management of the given environmental problem. 
 
4.  Application  of  our  proposed  analytical  framework  for  the  Poitou-
Charentes region  
4.1.  Property Rights System 
In the case of the water resource, the 1992 water Act states clearly that water is a common pool 
resource ("Water is part of the national shared heritage. Protecting it, generally enhancing it, and 
developing  the  resource  that  can  be  used  while  respecting  ecosystems  are  all  in  the  common 
interest"  and  "Water  use  belongs  to  everyone")(Our  translations).  The  2000  Water  Framework 
Directive states that "water is not a commercial product like any other, but rather, a heritage which 
must be protected, defended, and treated as such. By nature, water is a collective resource that 
cannot be treated as private property"(our translation). So, national public waters belong to the 
State  whereas  non-public  waters  fall  under  the  private  rights  legislation.  Due  to  the  collective 
function of water, the landlord, in the case of groundwater, or the owner of the river basin in the 
case of rivers, can use the water resource but this resource does not belong to them. Moreover, the 
administration restrains and regulates these water uses (Jegouzo, 2006). The 1992 water bill also lays 
down  the  general  principle  for  authorising  or  declaring  all  abstractions  of  surface  water  or 
groundwater, whether it is returned or not, and the administration can quantitatively limit the rights 
of use to protect the common interest. Farmers have thus been given rights to use the resource, and 
                                                           
5 Cereals : 91 % including 89 % for grain maize, 7 % for fodder (silage maize), and 2% for oil crops and protein crops. 
6  Agreste – ASP 2008. The Poitou-Charentes region produces 10% of the national grain maize production and is the second 






































the use of these rights by their owner is consequently legal. However these rights of use are reduced 
every year , in order to try and stop the imbalance between the use and the resource to be used.  
In  theory,  there  are  no  property  rights  on  the  water  resource  in  Poitou-Charentes.  In  practice, 
because of their abstraction licences and their corresponding water quota, farmers have rights of use 
over  the  resource.  But  these  rights  are  temporary,  non-exchangeable
7  between  users,  and  the 
volume of water is quantified but not guaranteed, given that the administration can decide to revoke 
the licence before "full use" of the quota (maximum quantity that can be abstracted, and not that is 
to be abstracted) has been made. The only uses to be "theoretically" guaranteed are, first, the use 
for the supply of drinking water, and second, the environmental use (minimum needs guaranteed 
when setting threshold values for a balanced management of the resource)
8. 
 
4.2.  Uncertainty : Measurement Problems and Imperfect Information  
The aim is to draw conclusions about the level of knowledge on the environmental problem with 
regard to the water resource in Poitou-Charentes. We can differentiate between clearly identified 
elements, and uncertainty elements. 
We already know that there are several distinct uses of the water resource, with different effects on 
the state of the resource (abstracting and non-abstracting uses, and varying volumes of abstractions). 
The majority of the abstractions are simultaneous and concentrated over a limited period of time, in 
the spring and in the summer, at a time when the level and the flow of resource are naturally at their 
lowest. Farmers and the supply of drinking water both need the most water during the summer 
months,  for  irrigation  and  to  provide  water  to  the  tourists  that  flock  to  the  Poitou-Charentes 
coastline respectively. This concentration of quantitative pressures leads to a concentration over a 
period of time of the damage actually done to the water resource and of the difficulties encountered 
by the resource-dependent economic activities. The geographical distribution of water abstractions 
in  the  region  means  a  corresponding  distribution  of  the  consequences  (not  concentrated  in  a 
particular  area),  with  peaks  depending  on  the  vulnerability  of  the  resource  and  the  level  of 
abstraction.  
Although the environmental use is considered a priority use, the threshold values set for an adequate 
resource management  are  exceeded every year  in several  areas,  despite  the  implementation  of 
restriction and banning measures, and this situation has a negative impact on the aquatic ecosystem. 
The environmental organisations denounce the impact that the abstractions - mainly of agricultural 
origin -have on the quantitative state of the water resource. They consider that the threshold values 
are  not  only  far  too  often  violated,  but  also  that  these  values  are  too  low  to  protect  streams 
efficaciously (they accuse the administration of being too lax). In practice, the problems that arise 
include recurring drying-ups and river flow failures, low piezometric levels, the disappearance of 
marshlands and an increase in fish mortality. The fact that a vast part of the region is included in the 
Water  Distribution  Zone  (where  the  water  resource  is  insufficient  with  regard  to  the  needs) 
underlines the recurring and chronic difficulties linked to the imbalance between the water resource 
and the needs.  
                                                           
7 Impossible, because the licence is attached to the farmer's pumping facility. With the implementation of the single 
organisation, the exchange between farmers could be an option. 






































Values below the MALWL and CLWL in Poitou-Charentes since 1995 
Number 
















































































Water  Level 
(MALWL)  
(monthly  average) 
defined  for  14  nodal 
points 
6  7  3  8  3  3  5  6  9  7  10  7  3  2  7 
Crisis Low-Water Level 
(CLWL)  
(daily average) defined 
for 11 nodal points 
4  6  3  8  5  2  2  4  8  7  10  7  2  0  7 
Source : DIREN, SPCA and SPCVT (data non available for 2 stations in 2006, and 1 station since 2007) 
 
These difficulties are more important downriver, as the decrease in the river flows also impacts on 
the development and reproduction of coastal animals, as a result of a modification in the physical 
parameters, namely the freshwater input. Shellfish farmers, well-implanted on the Poitou-Charentes 
coastline, denounce the impact that the heavy quantitative pressures have on their production level. 
We can also add that the low level of groundwater during the summer months, increased by the 
importance of abstractions, can induce a decrease in the water quality, especially in the confined 
ground water used for the SDW, due to the pollution of free groundwater. This phenomenon can 
compromise the adequate supply of drinking water in the summer, at a time when the high number 
of tourists make this particularly important. Finally, a decrease in the streams' level has negative 
effects on the boating activities on the river Charente. 
A decrease in the pressures on the resource allows to remedy some of the most visible damage done 
to the aquatic ecosystem, such as drying-ups and flow reductions
9. But this type of damage has 
lasting  effects  on  the  aquatic  ecosystem  (species  dying  out,  important  growth  of  algae  and 
phytoplankton harmful to the streams, impacts of high turbidity levels, effects on animal migrations, 
decrease in the groundwater levels and impact on the water quality...). Moreover, the disappearance 
of wetland is permanent and irreversible. Finally, given that shellfish production has a typical four-
year production cycle, any negative impact on the production will last several years. 
Clearly,  Poitou-Charentes  is  characterised  by  both  an  incompatibility  of  uses  and  episodes  of 
excessive  water  abstractions.  Identifying  the  activities  involved  is  easily  done,  but  measuring 
(quantifying) the damaging effects and the exact responsibility of the users is far more difficult to 
achieve. The relationships between abstractions and resource level are complex and non-linear. The 
results brought about by practical evolutions are only measurable in the medium or long term, and 
contextual factors influence the results (precipitation level, soil characteristics). There is a lack of 
scientific knowledge regarding the hydraulic system, in particular the way ground waters work, as 
well  as  the  link  between  the  surface  resource  and  the  ground  resource  (uncertainty  about  the 
volumes  actually  available,  the  current  and  future  recharging  of  these  resources,  the  degree  of 
resource  vulnerability  to  a  potential  degradation).  Nobody  knows  precisely  what  the  adequate 
volume of water for the resource to be in a good state is. We can also point out uncertainties 
                                                           






































concerning the added value for the water resource generated by the economic activities using this 
water.  
The most publicised resource use conflict, between farmers and shellfish farmers, is based on a lack 
of scientific knowledge. Shellfish farmers invoke, as we have just explained, the impact of water 
abstractions on their production activity, but no scientific study has ever clearly identified the link 
between the resource in freshwater and the level of shellfish production. 
However,  some  improvements  of  the  level  of  knowledge  in  Poitou-Charentes  can  be  noted, 
concerning negative externalities on the water resource from a quantitative perspective. In the past, 
the water removed by farmers was not measured or reported, and it was impossible to localise and 
calculate the volumes of abstracted water. Today, every farmer that has been granted an abstraction 
licence is legally obliged to measure the volume abstracted with a meter, and report the data to the 
administration, so that the latter can verify whether the authorised level has been observed, and 
monitor the abstraction levels (global volume of water abstracted over a given period of time, rather 
than abstracted flows, leads to an uncertainty about abstraction distribution within a period of time). 
Moreover, The Regional Centre for Aquacultural Research and Engineering (CREAA in French) has 
demonstrated with the help of a probe located on the Charente river that the volume of water is 
stagnant, which proves the absence of any freshwater input downriver, what had always denied by 
the  agricultural  world.  We  can  observe,  in  relation  with  knowledge  improvement,  a  growing 
awareness among farmers of the impact their activities have on the ecosystem and the other water-
dependent uses. Finally, to put a stop to the recurrent instances of below-threshold values, the 
administration is currently working, as part of the implementation of the Common Organisation for 
the Collective Management of Water Abstractions, on the assessment of the volumes of water that 
can actually be removed.  
We can also indicate that it is not always easy to make a clear distinction between a problem of 
"sheer" uncertainty, and the exploitation of this uncertainty by the agents for their own ends, in 
order to undermine the potential negotiations. 
4.3.  Transaction Structure : frequency, number of agents involved, degree of heterogeneity 
First of all, owing to the fact that most of the abstractions occurs at a time when the water resource 
is naturally at its lowest, quantitative problems around the water resource in Poitou-Charentes reach 
a peak every year during the high season. So, the question of managing this environmental problem 
is a recurrent one, hence a high frequency of transactions. 
Then, if we look at the collectives present in Poitou-Charentes, the situation appears to be rather 
simple. We have already mentioned that there are three abstracting uses (agricultural, industrial, 
SDW) that generate a nuisance for the other uses (environmental "use", and shellfish farming). From 
the outset however, we can somewhat adjust this first general impression, for a number of reasons. 
First, though all these uses are legal, they have different "statuses". Two uses are considered as 
priority  uses  and  are  as  such  theoretically  protected  by  the  administration  (SDW  and  aquatic 
ecosystem),  so  their  needs  are  integrated  into  the  calculation  of  the  threshold  values  for  the 
resource management
10. The other three uses are pure economic activities, the water resource being 
                                                           
10 The threshold values are established so as to guarantee that the needs of these two uses (supplying drinking water and 
maintaining a healthy aquatic ecosystem) are met before economic uses. The MALWL (Minimum Acceptable Low-Water 
Level) is the minimum value that guarantees that the needs for all uses are met, whilst maintaining a healthy aquatic 






































a raw material for the production activity. Among the abstracting uses, only one is granted rights of 
use : agriculture. Shellfish farmers do not abstract water but they need it for their activity, and suffer 
heavily from the pressures exerted on the resource, because they are located downstream of the 
river Charente. As a result, shellfish farmers are highly vulnerable owing to both their geographical 
and institutional situations. Due to this disadvantageous position, the shellfish farmers' opportunity 
cost to tackle the problem of externalities is more important than that of the other agents. Second, 
the water consumption profile changes depending on the uses : farmers exert the most quantitative 
pressures on the water resource, and the difference with the other abstracting users is even more 
important when we think in terms of net abstractions, given the low volume of water released back 
into  the  environment  by farmers,  in  comparison  with  the  other  users.  In  total,  there  are  three 
sources of nuisance in Poitou-Charentes, but the quantity of the water abstracted varies dramatically 
depending on the use. There are also discrepancies between the three abstracting uses regarding the 
mode of abstraction : agriculture abstracts 81% from groundwater through pumping and wells, and 
only 13% from surface waters and 6% from hill reservoirs (Agreste, RICA 2007), whereas the SDW 
abstracts water primarily from groundwater and the industry mainly from surface waters. Finally, a 
vast number of agents are involved in these uses and consequently involved in the water resource 
issues at the regional level. The number of irrigating farmers comes close to 4,000, for around 15 
industrial companies, over 450 water collection points for the SDW, and more than 1,200 shellfish 
farming  companies.  This  high  number  of  agents  means  a  great  number  of  abstraction  points 
scattered all over the region
11. The users have grouped together and formed collectives in order to 
defend their interests. As we can see, this finer analysis of the various Poitou-Charentes agents 
allows us to better comprehend the heterogeneity of the different collectives' situations.  
Finally, if we now analyse the situation within the collectives themselves, we can also notice a strong 
heterogeneity, that has been increasing over the past few years. This can be explained by recent 
evolutions due to political pressures, at the European and national levels, social pressures (including 
social claims and the role played by the public opinion) and economic pressures, and these pressures 
increase the collectives' internal heterogeneity.  
Shellfish farmers seem to offer a united front when seen from the outside. But internally, there are 
rivalries - linked to differences in the way the future of the profession is perceived - concerning the 
production activity itself as well as its spatial implantation. The first and oldest subcategory among 
the shellfish farmers tries to defend the age-old practice of producing on the foreshore, and the 
image of a traditional and natural product. This category is consequently highly vulnerable to the 
pressures exerted on the water resource, and finds itself in a situation of direct conflict with the 
irrigating agents. The other subcategory, younger and more innovative, tries to break away from the 
constraints weighing on the activity. It uses the most up-to-date innovations in shellfish farming, 
including  "off-bottom  culture  on  ropes"  and    controversial  "triploid"  oysters,  and  counts  major 
entrepreneurs. So, an internal division is taking shape among shellfish farmers, with small structures 
that use traditional production techniques on one side, bigger structures open to shellfish farming 
innovations for intensive production on the other.  
As for the agricultural world, it is undergoing an evolution that is the result of a twofold and relatively 
collective rising awareness. The first aspect of this awareness questions the image of agriculture that 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ecosystem are at risk. While the SDW has been preserved these past few years, the aquatic ecosystem has suffered from 
water shortages, as the threshold values were crossed at several nodal points in the region. 
11 The regional land area adds up to 25,809 square kilometres and the river Charente, the biggest river of the region, is 






































farmers want to offer to the other agents and more generally to society.  The agricultural authorities 
have  understood  the  necessity  to  show  the  public,  and  first  of  all  the  other  regional  and 
departmental institutional agents, that agriculture is changing its practices towards a greater respect 
of the environment. The second aspect is internal and less pronounced, due to the power struggles 
within the agricultural circle. We can witness the existence of segmentations within the profession 
concerning the productive adaptations and new approaches developed as a response to the water 
issue. In front of the growing weight of shellfish farmers, the increasing importance of environmental 
claims, and the internal dissensions over the agricultural production model, farmers can hardly stick 
to  their  line  and  further  deny  their  responsibility  on  the  state  of  the  water  resource,  both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. They are evolving towards a more conciliatory attitude, and the 
agricultural collective appears far less homogeneous than what is was thirty years ago. The results 
brought about by these evolutions materialises in a variety of different productive configurations, 
and consequently different pressures on the resource. 
The situation that we have explained speaks in favour of an analysis of individual cases so as to get a 
precise idea of the heterogeneity in productive configurations, and their impact on the pressures and 
dependence towards the resource.  
4.4.  Asset specificity 
In Poitou-Charentes, the agents involved in the negative externality with reference to the water 
resource have made important investments in specific assets.  
The SDW requires important investments for the construction of a number of pumping stations or 
water  collection  facilities.  These  investments  have  a  dimension  that  is  directly  linked  to  tourist 
attendance  (these  investments  must  supply  enough  drinking  water  to  a  population  twice  as 
important in the summer as during the rest of the year). Consequently, the "profitability" of the 
investments  made  is  highly  subject  to  tourist  attendance.    The  configuration  of  these  facilities 
depends on the type and the location in which the abstractions takes place (surface waters or ground 
waters mainly), and these investments cannot be redeployed from one site to another in the event of 
an aquifer running dry. 
Farmers have invested in real estate and in irrigation equipment that is adapted to their needs as 
well as to the configuration of the fields they farm and of their crops. As we can see, there is a site 
specificity since any relocation would be hardly feasible technically, and also very expensive for the 
farmer. Moreover, the farmers' needs for water  are at its highest in the summer, due to the crops in 
progress  and  crop  rotation.  A  shortage  of  water  for  a  constant  agricultural  structure  means  a 
important financial loss and this loss cannot be compensated by a significant water input at another 
time of year, in the spring or the autumn for example. Drought episodes lead to a slower plant 
growth and reduce the leaf surface. Though some crops are capable of withstanding drastic water 
shortages with no effect on the yield, some others, such as maize, see their productivity plummet 
with  the  first  water  restrictions,  all  the  more  if  the  drought  stress  comes  at  a  "critical  stage" 
(essential in the crop cycle), the flowering stage in the case of maize. When a significant water 
limitation  occurs  in-between  these  critical  stages,  the  consequences  on  the  production  are 
benign. The regional irrigating agriculture, primarily specialised in the production of maize, presents 
an important time specificity. 
Shellfish  farmers  have  also  made  significant  investments  in  specific  assets.  They  located  their 






































the Poitou-Charentes  region,  is  renowned  worldwide  for  its  specificity.  So, the  regional  shellfish 
farmers benefit from this label's popularity (brand name specificity). Any attempt at relocating would 
have an enormous impact in terms of costs and would be almost impossible to achieve, since ,first, 
their activity requires a location offering a strict mixture of freshwater and salt water, and there are 
only a limited number of shellfish farming concessions in France, and second, any relocation of the 
production would mean losing the Marennes-Oléron label. For these reasons, shellfish farmers are in 
a situation of geographical lock-in. Finally, once again, the shellfish farmers that have kept to the 
traditional production mode have needs for freshwater at key stages during the production cycle (for 
reproduction and fattening), as oysters and mussels need a strict mixture of freshwater and salt 
water  in  the  spring  and  in  the  summer,  otherwise  their  vital  process  is  compromised.  But  the 
significant  upstream  water  abstractions  during  that  period means  a  reduction  in  the  freshwater 
available in the estuary, and as a result impacts negatively on the shellfish production. And once 
again, a significant freshwater input at other periods of the year has no compensating effect on the 
production but is actually harmful (the important discharge of freshwater by farmers in the winter is 
also negative for the shellfish production).  
Finally, the water-dependent economic activities have developed skills specific to their production. 
Re-deploying these skills would be complicated and have a cost, in the event of the employees 
having to stop their economic activity and start a radically different one. 
So, both collectives' activities are characterised by a site and a time specificity, and by a brand name 
specificity in the case of shellfish farmers. For this reason, the agents are in a situation of strong 
dependence to the resource.  
 
We have just revealed, through the analysis of the various attributes of environmental transactions 
in the case of the quantitative water resource management issue in Poitou-Charentes, the origins of 
the transaction costs. We are now able to draw conclusions with regard to the management methods 
at our disposal in our case study. 
 





Application to the case of the water resource in Poitou-Charentes 
Property Rights 
Systems 
No property rights on the water resource owing to its communal nature. 
Rights of use granted to irrigating farmers, but temporary rights - non-exchangeable 
and not guaranteed. 






-  Different types of simultaneous uses, distributed over the territory, and several 
impacts. 
-  Recurrent negative externalities with peaks concomitant with low-water period. 
-  Negative externalities distributed over the territory with localised peaks depending 
on the resource vulnerability and the localised significance of the abstractions. 
-  Geographical discrepancy potentially significant between "causes" and 
"consequences". 
-  Some effects can hardly be remedied, if at all. 
-  Nuisance and user responsibility measurement problems. 










































-  High transaction frequency due to recurrent quantitative difficulties. 
-  Many  agents  involved,  but  some  organised  as  collectives  (farmers,  shellfish 
farmers,environmental organisations). 
-  Heterogeneity  between  the  collectives  due  to  different  legal  statuses  and 
consumption profiles. 
-  Increasing heterogeneity within the two main collectives involved (farmers, shellfish 
farmers) : diversity in the production configurations and consequently diversity of 
pressures on the resource and situations of vulnerability towards the resource. 
Asset specificity 
Specificity of SDW investments 
Site and time specificity for the agricultural and shellfish farming collectives 
Brand name specificity for the shellfish farmers 
￿  Strong dependence on the water resource 
 
5.  First results and implications  
 
The analysis of the characteristics of the environmental problem concerning the water resource in 
Poitou-Charentes  enables  us  to  understand  the  relative  efficiency  of  the  various  management 
methods potentially available. 
Let us first of all remember that Coase states that a negotiation between the involved parties is only 
to be considered if information is perfect, transaction costs non-existent, and the property rights are 
established. On the contrary, if the property rights are incomplete or the transaction costs high, 
another solution should be preferred to a Coasian negotiation. Coase identifies several potentially 
available  "management  methods",  and  promotes  the  analysis  of  cases  individually  for  the 
identification of the adequate management method. 
The  Poitou-Charentes  situation  is  characterised  by  an  absence  of  property  rights  on  the  water 
resource. Though the activities involved in the negative externalities are easy to identify, measuring 
the nuisance and the exact responsibility of users is complex to achieve owing to measurement 
problems and a lack of scientific knowledge. These uncertainties are sometimes exploited by agents 
for  their  own  ends.  The  recurrence  of  environmental  problems  leads  to  a  high  frequency  of 
transactions for the improvement of the state of the water resource. There is a high number of 
agents involved and they are distributed over a vast geographical area. They have different legal 
statuses,  consumption  profiles  and  abstraction  modes.  Several  users  made  the  choice  to  group 
together with the aim of better defending their interests, which means a reduction in the number of 
potential transactants. We can also observe a strong heterogeneity within the collectives involved, 
which leads to a diversity of production configurations and consequently a diversity of relationships 
with the water resource. Finally, the asset specificity entails a strong dependence of the activities 
with regard to the water resource. As we can understand, the complexity of the water resource 
environmental  problem  in  Poitou-Charentes  generates  important  transaction  costs  that  prevent 
direct negotiations. All these elements add up to speak in favour of a management by the authority, 
such as state intervention, in order to better control the contractual risks implied by the externalities 






































The State is considered as appropriate for the management of situations involving a high number of 
heterogeneous  agents.  Moreover,  its  high  degree  of  administrative  control  enables  to  thwart 
opportunist  behaviours,  contrary  to  Coasian-bargaining-type,  decentralised  solutions.  It  is 
appropriate for transactions affected by uncertainty and involving specific assets. Finally, it allows to 
reduce the costs generated when looking for agreement, as compared with a decentralised solution. 
 
This "conclusion" regarding the way of managing the environmental problem studied corresponds to 
what  has  been  implemented  in  Poitou-Charentes.  The  water  resource  is  now  mainly  managed 
through the implementation of volumetric monitoring
12, with strong state intervention and control. 
According  to  Richards  (2000),  "Where  transaction  costs  are  high  because  of  asset  specificity, 
uncertainty,  and  obstacles  to  measurement,  the  government  may  choose  to  use  one  of  the 
instrument under which it retains discretion".  
This management mode consists in granting a general volume (maximum authorised volume) to each 
irrigating farmer for the whole duration of the irrigation season (in most cases, from mid-June to 
mid-September). This volume is established by taking into account the farms' characteristics : the 
irrigated land area declared and the reference volume (volume per hectare needed to meet the 
needs of cultivated plants). The irrigation season can be divided into several periods, and with the 
aim of respecting the MALWL for the different nodal points, the general volume is distributed over 
the periods depending on the maize growth stages. Threshold values are determined for each nodal 
point and allow to monitor the state of the water resource. When the thresholds are reached, the 
authorised volume of water is reduced, or even cancelled. The irrigating agents have to report the 
abstracted volumes and the water police can control them during the irrigating season.  
Though the question of volumetric monitoring efficiency in Poitou-Charentes would require further 
investigations, this management method seems to be efficient at first sight :  first, the volumes 
abstracted by farmers stabilised to some extent between 2000 and 2004, and decreased by more 
than 18% from 2004 to 2006, and second, the irrigated areas decreased by 9% between 2004 and 
2005, and by 20% between 2005 and 2006. Farmers have turned to less water-dependent crops 
(wheat, and in smaller proportions oil seeds as well as temporary meadows) and are questioning 
their  irrigation  practices.  However,  the  question  of  the  role  of  volumetric  monitoring  on  the 
evolution of agricultural behaviours deserves an in-depth study through an analysis of other variables 
that could be an influence on agricultural behaviours, and in order to predict the future trends in the 
evolution of agricultural water abstractions. This is important, because though the reduction in the 
abstractions  is  already  visible,  the  effects  on  the  environment  have  no  yet  been  observed  (for 
example, no convincing evidence of a reduction in number of nodal points to have crossed the 
MALWL and CLWL since 2000), so it relevant to try and predict the evolutions in the agricultural 
behaviours  (the  decrease  in  agricultural  water  abstractions  observed  may  continue  or  only  be 
temporary). 
So, even though volumetric monitoring seems to have acted as an incentive in the reduction of 
irrigated areas and abstracted volumes, the threshold values for water resource management are 
reached every year, requiring crisis management to be deployed every year, when it should be 
exceptional. This situation does not allow to meet the quantitative balance target introduced by the 
Water Framework Directive and the 2006 Water and Aquatic Ecosystems Bill. To reach this target, a 
Common Organisation will be created in the relevant zones. The abstractable amounts will then be 
                                                           






































determined according to the ecosystems' needs and not according to the users' needs as used to be 
the case. Moreover, these abstractable volumes, called "ecological volumes", will be estimated for 
each basin, and the common organisation will be in charge of the distribution between users for each 
basin.  
The measurement of the efficiency in the state management of externalities regarding the water 
resource in Poitou-Charentes deserves to be continued and further researched, all the more so if we 
consider that the problem lies not so much in the elaboration of rules as in the enforcement of these 
rules. 
 
These first results lead to two other avenues of research. First, we can concentrate on the options 
available for the agents facing problems of externalities, with the aim of identifying more precisely 
what courses of action are available for the State. For this, we emphasise the necessity to take the 
context into account, that is to say understand the agents' positions in the physical space, in the 
space of resources, and in the space of coordination schemes. We show the importance of carrying 
out an in-depth analysis of the logics at work within and between the collectives of agents, of the 
systems of interdependence in which they are placed, and of the conflicts that divide them. Second, 
it appears relevant to analyse the evolution and the modes of evolution in the agricultural practices 
in the wake of the implementation of water management rules by the State, rules that have a 
restricting effect on  the  production  activity.  This allows  us  to  analyse  and  compare the  relative 
efficiency of the measures potentially available in a given territory. By doing so, we question the 
economic efficiency of the adopted behaviours, for the professionals on the one hand, and for the 
territory on the other. An in-depth analysis of the agricultural system in the Poitou-Charentes coastal 
zone would also allow us to demonstrate the importance of heterogeneity in the practices and in the 
farmers' behaviours.  
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